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The paper by Masato Kimura seeks to clarify the contributions and limitations of 
Japanese business diplomacy by looking at the business mission to Britain and the 
US in 1921-22, and the Japanese Economic Mission to Europe and the United States 
of 1937. The paper argues that Japanese business diplomacy, while of significance 
particularly in building up international human networks, was insufficiently influential 
to prevent political and military conflict. 
 
Peter von Staden's paper focuses on the Iron and Steel Promotion Law of 1917 as a 
case study to explore the significance of the shingikai (deliberative councils) as a 
forum for formal and significant debate on isses of importance to both business and 
government. The paper argues that business interests saw the shingikai as a locus 
where conflicting interests could be resolved, calling into question the widespread 
assumption of across-the-board covert decision-making in the Japanese government-
business relationship. 
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1The Contributions and Limitations of Japanese Business Diplomacy in the
Interwar Period: Case Studies of Two Major Economic Missions
Masato Kimura
1. Introduction
The paper’s purpose is to clarify the contributions and limitations of Japanese
business diplomacy in the interwar period through the analysis of two major
economic missions: the Eibei Hōmon Jitsugyōdan (the Japanese Businessmen’s
Mission to Britain and the United States) in 1921-1922 and the Ōbei Hōmon Keizai
Shisetsudan (the Japanese Economic Mission to Europe and the United States) in
1937.
The reasons why I focus on these missions are two-fold: first, these missions were
dispatched at very crucial times for Japan. That is, the Japanese Businessmen’s
Mission visited the United States, Britain and France (29 October 1921 - 5 February
1922) at the same time as the Washington Conference (12 November 1921 - 6
February 1922) that established the new comprehensive framework for the
Asia/Pacific region after World War I. The so-called ‘Washington Order’
supplemented the ‘Versailles Order’, and both represented fundamentally important
international thinking during the interwar period. The other mission, the Japanese
Economic Mission, visited the United States and Europe from 6 May until 27 July
1937. The period included the outbreak of the Marco Polo Incident on 7 July 1937,
that resulted in the quagmire of the Sino-Japanese War (1937 - 1945) that completely
destroyed the ‘Washington Order’.
Second, these two missions represented Japan’s business elite, or the zaikai, and
the Japanese government also entirely supported the dispatch of both missions. The
term zaikai has a very broad meaning. According to Ogata Sadako, zaikai can be
defined as follows:
‘Zaikai are generally regarded as a power elite who represented the interests
of the business community as a whole rather than of individual
businessmen.’i
Ogata’s definition is a general one, but there is another definition of zaikai in the
interwar period. Masataka Matsuura pointed out that the ‘zaikai means a very narrow
2business circle of the elite connected to political power’.ii And he defined as the zaikai
‘the core group in the business society which lasted between the two World Wars’.iii
In the interwar period in Japan, the zaikai was composed of members of major
business circles such as the zaibatsu, and several powerful local and national
associations such as the Chambers of Commerce in major cities. This paper will refer
to the zaikai as the major business groups and leaders who regularly expressed their
opinions on major political and economic issues and who sought to influence Japan’s
national policies from the beginning of the 1920s until the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War in 1937.
Generally speaking, American and European business leaders had a substantial
effect on international relations in the interwar period because reconstructing the
world economy, in particular the European one, was a major challenge for that
period. In particular, American business leaders could participate in the decision-
making process aimed at developing economic policies in their country and in the
League of Nations. On the other hand, the effect of Japanese business leaders on
international relations at the same period was not necessarily clear. Through an
analysis of these two missions, one can identify the zaikai’s views on international
relations and some important aspects of the zaikai’s influence on Japan’s foreign
relations and on government- business relations.
The Japanese economy, as a result of structural changes occurring during World
War I, became the strongest and the most internationalized one in Asia, and this was
part and parcel of its close relationship with the world business community in the
1920s. Japanese business leaders made it a priority to participate in so-called global
thinking as a ‘first-tier’ nation. As just mentioned, the Japanese Businessmen’s
Mission visited the United States, Britain and France at the very same time as the
Washington Conference that established the comprehensive framework for the
Asia/Pacific region after World War I was taking place.
The first mission can be contrasted to the later Japanese Economic Mission in 1937,
which was dispatched in order to re-establish relations between Japan and the
United Sates, Britain and Germany. The leadership of the later mission resisted
Japan’s isolation from the world business community and encouraged international
3free trade, uttering grave warnings about autarky and economic nationalism,
pronouncing these forces a menace to world trade and a threat to political stability.
There have been few studies on these economic missions, but one can find several
important dimensions of Japanese business thinking in the interwar period through
analysis of the following topics.iv This paper will examine: 1) what kind of views did
Japanese business leaders have on the international society during the interwar
period; 2) what did they try to accomplish through these two missions and what were
the accomplishments and failures; and 3) an analysis of the contributions and the
limits of Japanese business diplomacy at this time.
2. Case 1: The Japanese Businessmen’s Mission in 1921-1922
The zaikai’s view on international relations
World War I and the Russian and Chinese revolutions that occurred in the 1910s
changed the fundamental structure not only of domestic factors in each country, but
also of international society. Japan’s exports exceeded imports for the first time since
the beginning of the Meiji era because of the unprecedented prosperity for Japan’s
export and shipping industry caused by World War I. Japan increased its exports
rapidly and obtained tremendous foreign income, which offset its serious foreign
debts after the Russo-Japanese War. In terms of its international debit and credit
accounts, Japan changed to a creditor nation. Consequently, the Japanese economy
had become the strongest and the most internationalized in Asia, and was deeply
involved in the new order of the international economy after World War I. This new
status was part and parcel of its close relationship with the world business
community.
In establishing the new framework of the international economy, the initiative was
taken by Financial and Economic Conference under the auspices of the League of
Nations. Not only government but also business leaders had an important role in this
conference. Central to the new framework was the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), that was established in 1920 as an international non-governmental
organization whose goal was to establish a cooperative system in the international
business world and accelerate the reconstruction process of the European economy
that had been destroyed by World War I.v In particular, American business leaders
such as Thomas Lamont and Owen Young were very interested in reconstructing the
4European economy so that it would be a foundation for the stability of the world
economy. Such American and European business circles’ aggressive activities
spurred the Japanese zaikai to participate in current world affairs.
The zaikai faced the challenge of responding to the new international dimensions of
the Japanese economy. First, the Shōgyō Kaigisho (chambers of commerce), which
had been public economic and business organizations since the late Meiji era,
changed their role to become representatives of small companies in local areas after
the Nihon Kōgyō Kurabu (Japan Industrial Club) was established in 1916 and
subsequently took the initiative in submitting economic proposals to the government.vi
In other words, the chambers of commerce could no longer respond to the radical
change unfolding within the industrial structure after World War I. Even the Japan
Industrial Club, however, did not include banks which were involved in the Ginkō
Shūkaisho (Bankers Club), so there was an urgent need for the zaikai to establish a
new and comprehensive business organization to replace the Shōgyō Kaigisho
Rengōkai (Associated Chambers of Commerce) with one that substantially
represented Japanese businesses if they were to participate in the ICC as a formal
member. However, Japanese business leaders did not have detailed information
about the ICC.
How, then, did the zaikai perceive international relations after World War I? Although
Shibusawa Eiichi, who has been called ‘the father of modern Japanese capitalism’,
retired from the zaikai in 1916, from the viewpoint of business diplomacy, he
remained one of the most important figures. There were three reasons for this: 1)
Shibusawa was one of the most famous internationally minded Japanese business
leaders because of his energetic international activities from the beginning of the 20th
century; 2) Shibusawa had a broad and strong personal network of contacts not only
in the economic and business worlds but also in the political and academic worlds in
both Japan and the United States; and 3) Shibusawa was extremely adept in Japan’s
non-governmental economic diplomacy.vii He had already visited the United States,
Britain and France in 1902 as President of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce.
Moreover, he took the initiative in leading the Tobei Jitsugyōdan (Japanese Business
Mission to the United States) in 1909, which was the first and biggest Japanese
economic mission up to that point in time. This mission was composed of over 30
Japanese business leaders, and some scholars and their families. It was also
5Shibusawa who seized the opportunity of sending the Japanese Businessmen’s
Mission to the United States and Europe.
Shibusawa thought that the current economic changes effected by World War I were
worldwide and should be welcomed as the positive and direct changes in both
Europe and the United States were likely to lead to the development of Japan’s own
economy. Shibusawa, therefore, thought that, given Japan’s world position, it was
reasonable to expect that her economy would have a major, and even a severe
impact on the Asia/Pacific region after World War I.
He also understood how important it was for Japan to find a way to cope with these
challenges. Shibusawa paid attention to the role of the League of Nations and
international cooperation movements such as the International Labor Organization
(ILO). He stated in his speeches that the main purpose of the League of Nations was
forever to protect the world from the blind actions of power and violence. However,
he pointed out that Japan should try to exclude those rules which hindered the
development of the Japanese economy. At the same time he added that Japan
should sometimes accept the various burdens that accompanied its participation in
the League of Nations.viii Shibusawa’s ideas and views were commonly reflected in
the zaikai’s mainstream thinking, although the concrete responses for each issue
were not necessarily the same. Go Seinosuke, for example, another Japanese
business leader, thought that since Japan was a first-class country, the zaikai should
seek broad contact with the world business community.ix
The zaikai strongly anticipated worldwide disarmament. The Osaka Chamber of
Commerce, for example, submitted its proposal on aggressive disarmament to the
Japanese government in 1920. Pointing out that the increase of military expenditure
would be a big burden for the sound development of the private sector of the
economy, the proposal insisted that Japan should aggressively propose its own plan
for worldwide disarmament.x
The zaikai also expressed concern and anticipated changes in the relationship
between Britain and Japan after the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had
been the axis of Japan’s diplomacy since 1902. Japan’s victories in the Russo-
Japanese War (1904-1905) and World War I (1914-1918) were achieved under the
aegis of this alliance. From the economic and business point of view, the zaikai held
6a positive view of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the way it promoted the
establishment of the gold standard system in Japan, as well as Japan’s trade and
commerce, by virtue of the international exchange system based on the pound
sterling. The alliance confirmed the credit worthiness of the Japanese economy, that
Japan could borrow large amounts of foreign capital from Europe and the United
States.
However, as a result of the Washington Conference a new treaty was formulated
between the United States, Britain, France, and Japan that replaced the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. There were three reasons for this: (1) the rapid advance of
Japanese goods in the Chinese market clashed with British and the U.S. interests;
(2) the German threat, one of the main targets of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance,
disappeared as a result of Germany’s defeat in World War I; and (3) the United
States and some of the Commonwealth Nations strongly opposed the renewal of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In particular, the United States formulated a new set of
concepts for China’s development and the Pacific/Asia order after World War I.
Japan worried about America’s views and activities. Britain was also cautious about
the ignorance and lack of experience of the United States in Asia, in particular in
China, expecting America’s economic power to be focused on the reconstruction of
the European economy. However, British businesses realized the necessity and
benefits accruing from any exchange of ideas between British and Japanese
business leaders. There were two reasons for this: (1) to maintain Britain’s superior
share in the Japanese market and (2) to cope with economic frictions with Japan in
the markets both of China and of Empire nations such as India.
Japan had been an attractive market for British businesses since the opening of
Japan at the end of the Tokugawa period in the 1850s. Japan imported various kind
of machinery, iron, battleships and ocean-going vessels from Britain. From the
beginning of the 20th century, however, American manufactured goods began to flow
into the Japanese market. British businesses wanted to protect their share in the
Japanese market from American rivals.
There were in addition signs that Japanese cotton goods had begun to compete
severely in China with Britain’s, and in Empire markets such as India and elsewhere
in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the rapid development of the Japanese merchant
7marine during World War I decreased Britain’s share of  East Asian maritime trade
routes. Under these circumstances, British businesses wanted to negotiate with
Japanese businesses in order to recover their share of the East Asian market and to
reconstruct their own economy as soon as possible.
The purposes of the Japanese Businessmen’s Mission to Britain and the United
States
The purposes of the Japanese Businessmen’s Mission were three-fold: (1) to
promote personal exchange with many business leaders who had influence over the
economy in both the United States and Britain; (2) to discuss bilateral economic
issues between Japan and these two countries; and (3) to observe the activities of
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. Dan Takuma, Chairman of
the Board of Directors of Mitsui zaibatsu, was nominated as the leader of this
economic mission.
In April 1921, Sir Charles Eliot, British Ambassador in Tokyo, asked Shibusawa Eiichi
to send the zaikai-sponsored mission to Britain. E.F.T. Crow, the British Commercial
Attaché in Tokyo, also proposed to invite the Japanese economic mission to Britain
at the same time. Shibusawa informed Prime Minister Hara Takashi about Britain’s
proposal and advised Hara to promote mutual personal exchange between Britain
and Japan. In July 1921, Shibusawa and prominent Japanese business leaders,
such as Inoue Junnosuke, Dan Takuma, Fujiyama Raita and Wada Toyoji, discussed
how to organize the economic mission in a meeting at the prime minister’s official
office. Prime Minister Hara, who paid attention to the good relationship between
Japan and the United States, strongly supported the economic mission. The idea of
the Japanese Businessmen’s Mission was therefore based on cooperation with
Britain and the US, and on economic rationalism.
The itinerary of the Japanese Businessmen’s Mission
The Japanese Businessmen’s Mission visited several American cities, including New
York, Chicago and Washington D.C., from 29 October until 13 December 1921. In the
United States, Japanese business leaders met major politicians and business leaders
and exchanged opinions. They confirmed, in particular, the necessity of disarmament
and the improvement of mutual trade and understanding between Japan and the
United States.
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industrial cities, including London, Manchester and Glasgow, between 19 December
1921 and 1 February 1922. In Britain, the Mission discussed several issues relating
to the relationship between Japan and Britain such as the improvement of mutual
trade and understanding. At the same time, Japanese business leaders studied the
British economy and such things as the relationships between managers and
workers.
Finally, the Mission arrived in Paris to visit the headquarters of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC). They were surprised and impressed by the newly
established European and American business organization and its activities.
3. Case 2: the Japanese Economic Mission of 1937
The zaikai’s view on international relations
After Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations and the failure of the World
Economic Conference in London in 1933, the zaikai was eager to build  economic
relations with the United States and European countries such as Britain, France and
Germany. They also changed their attitude towards the ICC and attached more
importance to it. By the beginning of the 1930s, Japan was recovering from the great
financial shock that had been caused by the international economic catastrophe in
1929, the so-called ‘Black Thursday.’ The dramatic decline of the yen had become an
export advantage and an encouragement for import-substituting industries. Japanese
companies were sufficiently efficient that their products soon advanced into world
markets. European countries, in particular Britain and Holland, severely criticized
Japan’s export-oriented activities as ‘social dumping’.
From 1934 to 1937, the zaikai did its best to avoid isolation from the world. After the
London Economic and Monetary Conference in 1933, the Japanese government and
the zaikai had been negotiating with the U.S. and Britain to explore a new set of
cooperative relations within the framework of a bilateral relationship. One of their
experiments was the mutual exchange of economic and business missions between
these three countries. They included three large missions: the British Mission by Lord
Barnby in 1934; the U.S. mission led by Cameron Forbes in 1935; and the Japanese
mission led by Kadono Chokurō in 1937.
9What did Japanese businesses think about international circumstances at the time,
and what did they do to sustain good relations with the more developed Western
countries, in particular the U.S. and Britain? Basically, they thought that close
relationships between these countries were a life and death matter for the Japanese
economy and business. In order to maintain these relationships, it was absolutely
necessary to prevent any trend toward autarky and economic nationalism.
Kushida Manzō, Director General of Mitsubishi Bank and Chairman of the Japanese
National Committee, uttered a grave warning against autarky and economic
nationalism in the 1930s. After explaining the circumstances of the Japanese
economy, he warned, ‘every country is today more nationalistic in its commercial
policy than ever before. This economic nationalism is indeed a menace to the
recovery of world trade; and this strong trend, if it is not checked in time, will
inevitably tend to engender international ill will and may even threaten international
political stability’.xi And he continued, ‘This is, perhaps, a very strong statement but
we ought to take it as a warning, because economic nationalism would, in the least,
reduce the volume of world trade to a minimum’.xii  He concluded, ‘If expansion of
international trade is the right road to world prosperity, as we believe it assuredly is,
and the interdependence of commercial countries is fully recognized, then the time
must come when commercial policy will be so modified that international exchange of
commodities will be far less restricted than it is today’.xiii
The purpose of the Japanese Economic Mission
The zaikai decided for practical purposes to send an economic mission to the U.S.
and Europe in order to exchange views among business leaders and to participate in
the general congress of the ICC held in Berlin. The purpose of this mission was
fourfold: (1) to promote personal exchanges between politicians and business
leaders who had an influence over the politics and economy in each country; (2) to
conduct return visits in response to both the Barnby Mission and the Forbes Mission;
(3) to discuss bilateral economic issues between Japan and these two countries; and
(4) to make a proposal at the Berlin Congress in 1937 that Japan was willing to host
the next general congress of the ICC in Tokyo in 1939.xiv The Hayashi Senjūrō
cabinet strongly supported this economic mission, because Japan was seriously
looking for ways to improve Japan-Anglo-American relations.
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Kadono Chokurō, Vice President of the Ōkuragumi, was nominated as leader of this
Japanese Economic Mission.xv He had prior experience of having participated in the
Japanese Businessmen’s Mission of 1921-2. Before participating in the general
congress of the ICC in Berlin, the mission visited the U.S. and was welcomed by a
number of American business leaders in several cities such as San Francisco, Los
Angeles, Dallas, Chicago, and New York.
Both Japanese and American business leaders discussed several important trade
issues between the two countries such as cotton, textiles and automobiles. Generally
speaking, discussions went well on the bilateral trade issues because both sides
basically supported free trade, and the two countries did not face serious mutual
economic conflicts.xvi For American businesses, this Japanese mission created a
good opportunity to exchange views on the political and economic situation in both
Japan and China.xvii  However, officially they did not choose to discuss the Chinese
problem. As is well known, there was a big gap between their views on Japan’s
invasion of Manchuria and the creation of Manchukuo.
The Japanese Economic Mission also asked American business leaders to support
the invitation extended to host the general congress in Tokyo in 1939. For example,
Winthrop W. Aldrich, President of the Chase National Bank, received a letter from
Yoshida Hatsujirō, who worked in the New York office of Mitsui & Company Ltd.,
asking him to support Japan’s proposal. In his letter Yoshida said, ‘Japan has already
received assurances of sympathetic reaction to her proposal from British, German,
Belgian and Australian National Committees’.xviii Aldrich replied to Yoshida that he
approved the invitation to convene the general congress in Tokyo and asked Thomas
J. Watson, President of the ICC, to accept Japan’s proposal. Thomas Lamont and
other American business leaders also supported Japan’s proposal.xix
The Japanese government also supported hosting the ICC’s general congress in
Tokyo in 1939, because it would be a good opportunity to introduce Japan to foreign
businesses, portraying Japan as the best business partner for Western nations in
Asia, the most civilized country in Asia, and the site of the Tokyo Olympics in 1940.xx
Next, the Japanese mission visited Berlin to participate in the 9th Congress of the
ICC. Participants’ discussions at the 1937 Congress focused on world economic
reconstruction and growing trade blocks and bilateralism. The keynote theme of the
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congress was ‘world peace through world trade’. Thomas J. Watson, the newly
elected president, enthusiastically led the discussion to find new approaches to
realize this key concept.xxi Watson was the President of IBM, and was well known as
a staunch supporter of Cordell Hull’s trade policy in the US Secretary Hull had a
vision that ‘governments will serve the best who can check the drift into bilateralism
and restore the machinery of multilateral trade’.xxii In reality, however, it was quite
difficult to stop autarky and economic nationalism, about which Kushida had given a
strong warning earlier.
Japanese business leaders participated in almost all sessions and they explained
Japan’s view on each problem and the current situation of the Japanese economy.
They also appealed to others who held Japan’s strong attitude towards maintaining a
sustainable free trade system. Having succeeded in persuading its members, the ICC
formally accepted Japan’s invitation at the Berlin Congress on 27 June 1937.
Finally, the Japanese delegation visited London and Liverpool from 5 July until 27
July. Several official visits including one to Buckingham Palace to meet the King. At
meetings with cabinet members such as the Foreign Minister and the Trade Minister,
and with members of the London Chamber of Commerce, Japanese business
leaders discussed important issues with British business leaders such as Lord
Barnby. The main themes were as follows: (1) Anglo-Japanese political relations; (2)
industrial competition between Britain and Japan; (3) trade control;(4) specific trade
issues; and (5) the China problem.xxiii
From an economic and business point of view, both groups of business leaders
discussed a number of issues regarding Anglo-Japanese trade frictions. These
included aspects such as import quotas and protective trade policy. Japan and Britain
well recognized the importance of cooperation between the two countries, although
the gap between the two nations was not appreciably narrowed at this time. In
addition, they discussed the possibility of Anglo-Japanese cooperation in the Chinese
market.
Unfortunately, the Sino-Japanese War that commenced in July 1937 forced the ICC
to subsequently decline Japan’s invitation to hold the next congress in Japan.xxiv
Japanese business leaders suffered a serious shock because they did not expect
that the Sino-Japanese War would drag on endlessly. Many Japanese business
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leaders were reluctant to disagree with the U.S. and European countries, because
they understood the fact that Japan could not survive without trade with those
countries. In particular, the U.S. and the British Empire and dominions nations held
the power of life and death over the Japanese economy. Almost all of Japan’s
strategic goods were imported from those countries, so that Japan probably was not
in a position to adopt contrary positions. However, after the Incident of 26 February
1936, the Japanese military controlled the freedom of speech in Japan, and
Japanese business leaders could not oppose the government or the military (gunbu)
publicly. If the general congress had taken place in Tokyo in 1939, over a thousand
business leaders and their families could have visited Tokyo and it would have had a
tremendous positive effect not only on Japanese businesses but also on political and
military circles. Sadly, this was not to happen.
4. The Contributions and the Limitations of the two Missions
The contributions of the two missions
What, then, were the contributions made by these two missions? First of all,
according to a variety of materials, including articles in major newspapers, there
seems no doubt that Brtish, U.S. and Japanese business leaders effectively
promoted mutual understanding not only regarding the world order after World War I
but also regarding bilateral economic and business relations. Therefore, Japan could
introduce new technology and a significant amount of money from Anglo-American
companies and financiers during the interwar period.
The second contribution was the enlargement of the zaikai network. Before the Eibei
Hōmon Jitsugyōdan, the zaikai network was based on a triangular relationship
between the United States, China and Japan. Furthermore, major European business
leaders were not very interested in personal exchange with Japan before World War
I. However, after World War I, Japan became one of the big five countries, and the
rapid growth of the Japanese economy changed European business leaders’ views
on Japan and the Far East. They began to think that Japan would be the centre of
the Far East instead of China, because China was still in chaos in the 1920s. These
two missions enlarged businessmen’s networks to include European countries.
Third, the Japanese Businessmen’s Mission of 1921-2 promoted the establishment of
the Nihon Keizai Renmeikai (Japan Economic Federation) in 1922. Both the Japan
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Economic Federation and the Associated Chambers of Commerce organized the
National Committee of the ICC which entered the ICC as a formal member in 1923.
Participation in the ICC and the pressure resulting from involvement in a range of ICC
activities contributed to preventing Japan’s isolation from the world community after
Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933. Japanese business
diplomacy was based on the bilateral relationships between Japan and America, and
between Japan and Britiain, and the network in the ICC. The ICC was an
international non-governmental business organization, one of whose goals was to
promote peace and cordial relations among nations. As Miles Fletcher has pointed
out, major Japanese business leaders such as Dan Takuma held ‘a firm belief that
Japan should cultivate closer ties with the Western powers’.xxv This view had a
positive effect on the mainstream of Japanese business.
As most of the discussions at general ICC meetings in the 1920s focused on the
reconstruction of the European economy, Japan did not play a conspicuous role.
However, these meetings also discussed the rules for international economic
activities in finance, production, distribution, transportation and communications. The
future system of the European economy was expected to have a major influence on
the Japanese economy. However, although some famous international business
leaders, such as Inoue Junnosuke and Dan Takuma, served as consecutive
secretary generals of the Japanese National Committee, few other Japanese
businessmen had an interest in the ICC. Therefore, through the 1920s, Japan’s
attitude towards the ICC was that it was enough for Japan to maintain only routine
contact.xxvi The only thing that Japan took sharp notice of in connection with the ICC
was the particular matter of Chinese business leaders’ anti-Japanese activities.xxvii
As I mentioned before, once there was a consensus in the 1930s that the most
crucial problem for the world was to emerge from serious depression and to
reconstruct the world economy, the zaikai paid more attention to the ICC. However, a
number of assassinations, including the Incident of 26 February 1936, killed
distinguished business leaders such as Inoue Junnosuke, Dan Takuma and
Takahashi Korekiyo, and certainly weakened the zaikai’s power in the Japanese
political and economic world. The Japanese Economic Mission was the last chance
for the zaikai to rebuild its relationships with the United States and European
countries before World War II. Although its purposes were not realized in the short
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run, the human networks that were reinforced during the mission ultimately proved
most useful for Japan’s return to the international business community after World
War II.
The limitations of the Japanese Businessmen’s Mission and the
Japanese Economic Mission
Unfortunately, the zaikai’s persistent inclination to separate economic problems from
international politics confronted real limits, although there was a difference between
these two missions. First of all, there were several business leaders who objected to
such activities in the mainstream of the zaikai. For example, Mutō Sanji, President of
the Kanebō Spinning Company, severely criticized Inoue Junnosuke’s role in
establishing the Keizai Renmeikai from the viewpoint of business-government
relations. According to Mutō, the establishment of the Keizai Renmeikai under the
auspices of Inoue strengthened government control of the ‘business community’.xxviii
The zaikai focused on discussing economic and business issues, but, as is well
known, the real challenges that Japan embraced in the interwar periods were deeply
related to its policy towards China and to social problems such as immigration and
race discrimination. Japanese business leaders were reluctant to discuss these
issues directly and officially. For example, the Japanese Businessmen’s Mission of
1921-2 avoided discussing the movement against Japanese immigrants and did not
visit San Francisco, which was a hotbed for anti-immigrant hostility.
In 1937, the Japanese Economic Mission picked up these issues, but they could not
find a solution to those problems. Japanese business leaders thought that Japan
had her special interests in Manchuria and that Japanese businesses were not
wrong to be active in China. Moreover, they stressed that Japanese businesses had
good relations with many Chinese businesses and wanted to cooperate with
American and European companies in the Chinese market. In particular, they
expected British business leaders’ attitudes to be positive, because the Barnby
Mission in 1934 had accepted the existence of Manchukuo.
These views were too optimistic and lacked a sufficiently deep understanding of
Chinese nationalism and the anti-Japanese movement that confronted not only
politicians but also businessmen and common people in the whole of China in the
interwar period. Therefore, Japanese business leaders were shocked by the ICC’s
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quick decision to cancel the Tokyo Congress of the ICC immediately after the Marco
Polo Incident. American and European business leaders were not about to condone
or sanction Japan’s invasion of the important areas of China such as Beijing and
Shanghai. Moreover, these two business missions avoided other hot issues between
Japan and Britain and America. For example, the Japanese Economic Mission did
not include any representatives of the merchant marine, which was one of the most
severe sources of conflict between Britain and Japan at that time.
5. Conclusion
According to the above analysis, the zaikai’s main interest was how to support and
maintain the free trade system and the stable international monetary system that
sustained the free trade system in the interwar period. In order to accomplish their
policy, it was absolutely necessary for Japan to forge good relations with the United
States and Britain because these two countries had overwhelmingly strong power,
controlled strategic natural resources such as crude oil, and offered potentially large
and open markets for Japan.
Overall, Japanese business diplomacy had a significant effect on the international
environment. The Japanese economy and its businesses could increase trade and
commerce, yet it could not prevent the invasion of the Japanese military into the
Chinese continent and the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941. Even pro-
Anglo-American business leaders in Japan had a special feeling about Manchuria
and China as part of a Japanese sphere of influence. As a result, these leaders were
overly optimistic about the degree of understanding expected from Anglo-American
business leaders, and they underestimated their caution and warnings about Japan’s
invasion into China. There was a decisive difference between Anglo-American
business leaders’ views and Japanese ones regarding Japan’s military actions in
China. In short, businesses were not able to function as an effective deterrent to war.
In this sense, Japanese business diplomacy did not have enough power to prevent
the war.
On the other hand, analysis of these two economic missions allows us to say that
Japanese businesses established a broad human network with business leaders in
the United States and European countries, based on their strong reliance on and
support of the free market economy. This network was crucial in its ability to promote
16
Japan’s early return to the world business community after World War II.xxix In
general, business activities are based on profit seeking. Such profit seeking attitudes
reflect not only short-term interests but also long-term interests, and these attitudes
should also be considered as being broader than narrow day to day economic and
business activities.
The two economic missions built the human business network that in the long run
could reconstruct not only the Japanese economy but also the world economy. In
that sense, one might say that business diplomacy had a role in rehabilitating the
world economy in a way similar to that in which Chinese herbal medicine rehabilitates
the body. That is to say, the herbal approach does not operate quickly with effects
that can be compared to surgery. Nonetheless, the alternative therapy can influence
the recovery of the body and contribute to its long-term health
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Business Shaping Political Decision Making?  
An Examination of the Iron and Steel Promotion Law of 1917 
 
Peter von Staden 
 
How we see relations between government and business in Japan today is, in part, a 
product of the literature on economic policy formulation and its related literature on the 
explanations for post-war economic success. These works, largely by omission, cast the 
relationship as covert, depicting government-business interaction in the process of 
political decision making as occurring behind closed doors. Hence they arguably serve 
the ends of speculation. Moreover, the comparative paucity of scholarly literature on the 
Taishō (1912-1926) period and early Shōwa (1926-1989) years facilitates the reinforcing 
of dominant post-war perceptions. This is furthered by arguments based on the historical 
legacy of the close relations between ruling powers and large business families. In short, 
how we think about decisions that emerge from politico-business interaction rests largely 
on assumptions, and the impact of insufficient empirical research. This is not to suggest 
that discussions in surroundings, such as tea houses, do not take place. Indeed, there is 
far too much smoke to imagine that there is not some fire behind it all. This fact 
notwithstanding, the notion that shady deals and opaque decision making are inherent 
to Japan’s way of doing things demands scrutiny. Such notions underscore the 
necessity for a clearer understanding, if only in the end to confirm existing assumptions. 
By definition, records are scant on closed-door discussions and so scholarly enquiry 
must look for an indirect method to address the validity of these assumptions.  
 
An examination of the formal decision making process of the Iron and Steel Industry 
Promotion Law (Seitetsu Jigyō Shōrei Hō) of 1917 provides insight into how government 
and business operated for a number of reasons. First, the records of the shingikai, or 
Councils of Deliberation, and other promulgations by trade associations such as the 
Industry Club of Japan (Nihon Kōgyō Kurabu) are detailed and afford a close view of 
government and business interaction at the point 'which marked the beginning of the 
government’s industrial policy'.1 Secondly, the particular economic circumstances 
created by World War I, which shaped and bracketed this decision making process, 
provide a unique opportunity to consider both the debate over the nature of government 
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and business interaction and the associated debate regarding the role of the shingikai in 
Japanese decision making. 
 
Perceptions on the post-1945 government and business relationship 
The prime question that underpins the research agenda in post-war Japanese economic 
history has been 'How did Japan do it?' The contending analyses differ according to the 
way they bring together the main actors - the bureaucracy, politicians and business - 
and, according to some accounts, the role of the market as well. Since the early 1980s, 
this tripodal configuration of actors has come to the fore with the seminal work of 
Chalmers Johnson which, with regards to Japan, has given common coinage to the term 
‘developmental state’.2 Such has been the impact of Johnson’s work that approximately 
a decade after its publication, one scholar viewed noted: 'The current prevailing 
conception of Japan, in both academic literature and the popular view, is of Japan as 
technocracy, ruled by a select group of bureaucrats motivated primarily by efficiency and 
by economic, rather than political concerns'.3 Business was seen less in terms of its own 
initiative but rather as the engine for economic growth conducted by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, though it was only after a painful trial and error process 
lasting many years that an acceptable arrangement was reached. 
 
In shaping post-war views on government and business relations in Japan, Johnson’s 
work has been of critical importance. Though received critically by some, the fact that 
hardly any subsequent work can avoid a mention of Johnson's work underscores this 
point. Many authors have adopted it as a point of departure and sought either to draw 
attention to its weaknesses and provide a more nuanced understanding of the inner 
dynamics of the developmental state, or to reject its conclusions and provide alternate 
explanations. At the very least Johnson’s work has left us thinking of the Japanese 
success as based on a particular configuration of co-operation between the bureaucracy 
and business  different from that elsewhere. In that sense it has been a dominant force 
in recent years in shaping our perception of politico-business interaction.  
 
Perceptions on the pre-1945 government and business relationship 
Research in economic history or the political economy of the post-1945 period is driven 
by knowing how Japan ‘succeeded’. Work on the late 1930s and through the war years 
has fed into the research on postwar 'success' by drawing out institutional learning and 
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other continuities.4 There is a substantial literature on the Meiji period (1868-1812) that 
attempts to explain how Japan managed to adopt so quickly its new ‘modern’ institutions 
and put itself on the path of industrialisation, but there is in many respects a curious 
dearth of research on the years from about 1912 - 1930. Reasons for this are unclear. 
The Taishō period is seen by some as a brief episode in Japan’s modern history when it 
experimented with western liberalism, bracketed by periods in which more autocratic 
approaches dominated. The view that the ‘honeymoon’ was peripheral to understanding 
how Japan really operates perhaps helps explain the paucity of literature. Whatever the 
reason, our understanding of how business and government operated in this period is 
limited. The assumption that business and government operated in hand-in-glove 
fashion is more entrenched than for the post-war period, but there is not equivalent 
empirical research. As we have a limited understanding of how business and 
government operated, the scope for speculation on the importance of covert interaction 
is that much greater. 
 
It is apparent that the the Big Four zaibatsu, namely Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and 
Yasuda, and other smaller ones such as Asano, Furukawa, Fujita and Kawasaki, 
benefited from the business opportunities that World War I afforded. However, though 
the Big Four held a major position in the economy at the time of the conflict, it was not 
until the 1920s, when many smaller businesses failed to weather the recession, that 
they 'established a clear hegemony'. Though 'their influence extended beyond business 
and into the political world, they did not have a monopoly on economic power'.5 By the 
late 1920s, Allen argues, the zaibatsu had greatly enhanced their ability to influence 
government decisions6, but between 1914 and 1919, the three largest zaibatsu, Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, accounted for approximately 28 percent of the total assets of 
the top 100 companies in Japan, excluding those owned by the government. Their 
position, though, varied according to the industry. Government firms included the largest 
iron and steel maker, Yawata (Yahata). In the iron and steel industry the zaibatsu's 
position diminished from 84.5 percent of private sector assets in 1914 to 41.7 percent in 
1919.7  
 
Addressing members in 1908, Nakano Buei, the president of the Chamber of 
Commerce, encouraged the advancing of business interests through political means.8 
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By 1917, of the 381 seats in the House of Representatives, 30 members had extra-
parliamentary careers in the bureaucracy (7.9 percent), 192 members were 
businessmen (50.4 percent) and 20 had careers which were both in the bureaucracy 
and business (5.2 percent).9 The business position in government was further enhanced 
by the funding of the two main political parties from the coffers of Mitsui and Mitsubishi. 
The former directed its funds to the Seiyūkai and the latter to the Kenseikai. Roberts 
claims that 'Hara was amply funded as president of the Seiyūkai. At the end of each 
year dietmen belonging to the party used to visit his home to pay their respects and 
receive envelopes stuffed with money. It was generally assumed that Mitsui provided a 
share of the party’s funds; evidence of the fact became public in 1920'.10 Direct 
involvement in government affairs by Mitsubishi can be traced back to at least 1896, 
when Iwasaki Yanosuke, head of the combine, helped to bring about the second 
Matsukata Cabinet.11  
 
Kinship also played a crucial part. From 1908 Iwasaki’s cousin, Toyokawa Ryōhei, head 
of the Mitsubishi Bank and chief director of the Tokyo Clearing House, 'undertook a role 
of leadership among Diet members'.12 Katō Takaaki, who married Iwasaki Yatarō’s 
eldest daughter, became president of the Kenseikai in 1916 and led a coalition cabinet 
in 1924. Similar influences were at work in the founding of the Industrial Club of Japan, 
whose focus on heavy industry made it a key organisation in the business-politics 
relationship. Funding of the Club was evenly divided between Mitsubishi and Mitsui, and 
Baron Dan Takuma, general manager of Mitsui, was its president from 1917 until his 
assassination in 1932. Kaneko Kentarō, a close friend of Baron Dan since their student 
days in the United States13, and whose younger sister married Dan, became Minister of 
Agriculture and Commerce in 1898 and Minister of Justice in 1900-01. He played a 
central role in the establishment of the Club.14  
 
The 1930s provided a new environment for politico-business relations characterised by 
changing economic priorities, growing governement intervention  and the presence of 
the military. Hirschmeier and Yui suggest that it was the 'young bureaucratic elite as well 
as the military… [who] abhorred the free market system with its possibilities of making 
profits out of scarcities'15 that in particular rankled with business, and in the early 1930s 
well-known businessmen clashed with government. As the war years progressed and 
  
 23
the strain on Japan increased, this 'weld[ed] the government and the business 
community together in a joint purpose. But their views did not coincide on business 
matters'.16 In the 1920s and 30s, it was rare to find businessmen assuming cabinet 
positions; in the 40s we find a number of prominent business figures in key government 
posts.17 
 
Notwithstanding connections based on economic strength, political participation and 
friendship, it is not clear that the large zaibatsu directly exercised their influence to 
receive specific benefits on a quid pro quo basis. Ikeda Seihin, who took over the helm 
of Mitsui after Dan’s death, acknowledged that financial support was given by both 
Mitsui and Mitsubishi to political parties. However, he claims that given the strength of 
the Big Three zaibatsu, they did not need to resort to underhand means in order to have 
their interests taken into account: given their economic size, their interests would be 
naturally considered in the political decision making process.18 Dan Takuma’s own 
biography,  written by a committee in 1938, claims that he would have no truck with 
political money - bribery -19, and in fact it was only late in life that he developed an 
interest in politics. Moreover, as a member of Mitsui, he was not allowed to participate in 
politics as there was a strict code that forbade such activity.20 Even Nakamigawa 
Hikojirō, vice president of Mitsui bank, recognised in the Meiji period that 'Mitsui Bank’s 
operational difficulties stemmed from its dependence on government patronage', and in 
1892 introduced reforms that started to steer the zaibatsu’s bank from the traditional 
path of the political merchant.21  
 
Matsuura Masataka has pointed out that Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo disliked their 
members' participation in political affairs. Moreover in 'the post-War [World War I] period, 
in general enterprises that were part of former zaibatsu already had huge economic 
power and were secure in their close association with the political elite, so they did not 
feel a need to participate in politics'.22 That the economic position of the large zaibatsu 
was such that it was not necessary to participate in politics does not imply that they did 
not actively exercise their influence through other informal means. Furthermore, as 
Ikeda pointed out, they were confident that given their structural position in the economy 
their interests would be taken into account in political decisions. Also, despite whatever 
rules had been established to prevent direct political participation, there seemed to be a 
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Nelsonic blind eye in at least two of the zaibatsu houses: in the 58th Diet of 1930 1.8 
percent of Minseitō members and 1.7 percent of the Seiyūkai members held positions in 
Mitsui and 3.7 percent of the Minseitō and 1.7 percent of the Seiyūkai were from 
Mitsubishi.23 It should also be noted that the remainder of the business community did 
not enjoy the same privileged position as the large zaibatsu, and probably did not fetter 
themselves with house rules preventing their employees from getting a leg-up on the 
competition.  
 
In the end, however, it is difficult to evaluate the degree to which business exercised its 
influence in government at this time. There is a decided lack of detail on how this 
interaction occurred.  Assumptions  made on the basis of  factors such as economic 
strength or diet presence, hold that business was having its way or at least having a say. 
There is thus a clear need for detailed empirically based work to test the truth of these 
assumptions. The limitations imposed by the scarcity of documents make systematic 
empirical research in this area difficult, but no less necessary.   
 
The Shingikai and the stakes in the iron and steel industry in 1917 
The term shingikai, or deliberative councils,24 is a collective term including bodies with 
the titles shingikai, chōsakai, iinkai, shinsakai, kyōgikai and kaigi. Such bodies have 
been convened since the Meiji period to deliberate and provide informed 
recommendations on issues as determined by government. Shingikai do not have the 
power to decide, though in particular situations they may be given the scope to do so.25 
The 'contemporary commissions differ from their pre-war cousins in nomenclature, legal 
basis, membership, and function'.26 However, the original central precept has not 
changed: ostensibly at least, shingikai have been, and remain today, a forum for extra-
governmental interests to participate in the process of policy formulation. However, in 
the pre-war period, participation by individuals not from business circles or academe, 
was very rare, though not necessarily forbidden. At the same time policy formulation was 
not seen as a matter  in which input from the common man was necessary, though 
popular demands did enter the calculus of political decision making through the latter 
years of the Taishō period.  
 
In comparison to the scholarly research on the shingikai of the post-war years, very little 
work has been done in either Japanese or English on the pre-war institution, in particular 
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with respect to its role in the political decision making process. Shingikai were 'formed 
by prime ministers, cabinets, individual ministers or high-level bureaucrats… [and the] 
legal instruments for their establishment were mainly imperial edicts, cabinet orders and 
ministerial ordinances, though several were formed by legislation'.27 In some instances a 
committee would be formed on the request of extra-government interests, though in the 
main they were established in response to initiatives from the 'particular administrative 
unit concerned'.28 In the case of an imperial edict, the emperor’s office would provide the 
operating rules and instructions, as well as select one of the divisions of the bureaucracy 
to organise the committee. In some instances, at least, membership numbers were 
determined by the emperor’s office, and also the numeric break down between the core 
members and those who would be called upon as experts in case of need. The names 
of the members seem to have been selected by the bureaucracy itself. It is also likely 
that where the shingikai was established by cabinet order or ministerial ordinance, the 
remit and details of operation of the committee would have been determined by these 
initiating authorities. Harari reports that 'membership was dominated by bureaucrats 
from relevant ministries; other salient categories of members were university professors 
and leaders of industrial and agricultural interests. A small number of labour leaders – 
and only those on the right wing of the labour movement – served on a negligible 
number of advisory bodies'.29  
 
Claims of the existence of a powerful bureaucracy in prewar Japan, as well as the 
infancy of political parties and the limited number of actors in policy making, give reason 
to believe that the shingikai were co-opted by the bureaucracy.  However, recent 
examinations of the shingikai suggest that this view is somewhat simplistic.30 Analysis of 
issues and arguments has underlined the need to view each shingikai as different, and 
to judge its effectiveness in terms of the issue at hand and the actors involved. In other 
words, a case-by-case examination is needed to determine whether the charge of 
bureaucratic co-option is valid.31 The role of the shingikai in the policy making process 
was clearly a complex one. It stands to reason, moreover, that business was unlikely to 
have turned to this shingikai forum in attempting to influence the political decision 
making process had they not felt it in their interest to do so. This would have been 
particularly so in times when the stakes were high, such as in the case of iron and steel 
policy during World War I.  
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Case study 
The onset of war is invariably accompanied by dramatic shifts in demand and supply to 
meet changed military needs among the belligerents and also their trading partners. 
Japan, though not a principal belligerent in World War I, benefited from this experience. 
For the iron and steel industry, the dramatic increase in demand combined with a 
shortage of supply created considerable problems. The total annual demand for iron 
increased from 505,000 tons in 1913 to 924,000 tons in 1919, and for steel, from 
751,000 to 1,165,000 tons.32 This increased demand was met by expanding the output 
of established plants, and by encouraging a large number of new entrepreneurs to 
invest in their own sites.33 However, Japan had largely relied on external sources of iron 
and steel, and there was a serious decline in imports. The supply of steel and iron from 
Britain and Germany  dwindled, though American steel imports did eventually increase 
because of a special arrangement regarding steel for ships which was formalised in the 
U.S.-Japan Ship and Steel Exchange Pact of 1918. Between 1913 and 1914, however, 
iron ore and steel imports dropped 36% and 25% respectively. With the export ban on 
steel imposed by Britain in 1916 and supply cut from Germany, the need for self-
sufficiency was brought into clear relief and Japan faced a ‘steel famine’.34  
 
The situation was exacerbated by government proposals. Capitalising on the increase in 
demand and rising prices, the state owned and government managed Yawata Works 
submitted  its third expansion plan to the 37th Diet in January 191635. The construction 
plan was approved by the Diet the following month.  Yawata, however,  did not normally 
sell its pig iron on the domestic market36. As the only integrated producer in Japan, it 
had adopted the policy of not directly selling pig iron to private firms, but using it for its 
own operations. The Kamaishi Works, a relatively large private sector enterprise, 
purchased foreign pig iron but used most of it for cast metal. The rest of the private 
sector had to compete for the 30,000 tons annual output of  the Wanishi Iron Works37, or 
look abroad for supply. Domestic steel producers therefore feared that Yawata would 
further expand and diversify its production of steel goods and hence strengthen its 
competition with the private sector.38  A sector reeling from the effects of tight supply of 
inputs, and with many smaller producers carrying heavy debt loads, viewed poorly the 
government decision to give preference to its own interests. Anxious to capitalise on the 
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strong demand for pig iron and steel, businessmen, 'realising their once in a thousand 
years opportunity', firmly opposed the plans for Yawata’s further expansion.39 
 
World War I was thus a fillip for the expansion of Japan’s iron and steel industry, but 
also brought problems that affected the plethora of newly founded private sites. Both 
business and government were stakeholders in the industry, and given the inflated 
prices, both sides had a particular interest in seeking their own ends. In response the 
government established a shingikai to consider the issue. The remainder of this paper 
will set out the process of decision making in the shingikai, through which the different 
actors established their positions and sought  to achieve their ends, and the outcome of 
the debate.  
 
The leading voices and the shaping of the debate40 
On 15 January 1916 approximately 500 members of the Rengō Danwa Kai (discussion 
group for matters of mutual concern) met in the Tokyo Station Hotel. This group was 
comprised of the Iron and Steel Institute of Japan (Nihon Tekkō Kyōkai), and the 
Academies of Electronics (Denki Gakkai), Machinery (Kikai Gakkai), Shipbuilding (Zōsen 
Kyōkai) and Armory (Kahei Gakkai). Inviting Oshikawa, the head of Yawata, to attend, 
they formed the Tetsuzai Jikyū Tōron Kai (discussion group on self-sufficiency in raw 
materials for iron production) to address some of the issues raised by the third 
expansion plan. Members from the academies of Civil Engineering (Doboku Gakkai), 
Architecture (Kenchiku Gakkai), and Japanese Mining (Nihon Kōgyō Kai), were also 
invited to attend. Participants were therefore largely derived from the academic and 
business worlds. The principal speakers included Imaizumi Kaichirō, chief engineer and 
managing director of Nihon Tekkan, and one of the directors of the Iron and Steel 
Institute of Japan, who proposed government and private sector co-operation. He 
argued that 'the question of whether the demand for iron and steel is sufficient is only a 
problem for government managed steel mills (Yawata)' and that 'in order to induce the 
rapid rise of the private industry, Yawata should produce all the pig iron and the steel 
ingots etc., while the private sector should from this produce the finished products. 
Through this means, some of the pressure on  private industry can be alleviated'.41 This  
meeting marked the start of a serious confrontation between the government managed 
Yawata Works and the private sector.42 
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The following month the discussion group produced its 'Proposal for the Establishment 
of a Committee of Inquiry into Joint Public-Private Iron and Steel Manufacture  (Minkan 
Gōdō Seitetsu Chōsakai Setchi Kengi). The central proposal was that 'in order to put on 
a more solid footing the independence of our industry, a policy for the long term self-
sufficiency of iron and steel must be tried'.43 
 
At the same time Imaizumi formally expressed his views in his 'Opinion Regarding the 
Third Expansion of Yawata', in which he again emphasised the need for co-operation 
between government and private sector.44 Submissions on the issue were made to both 
houses of the Diet. One petition author, Kawasaki Suketarō, a businessman from 
Osaka, outlined that private capital should be poured into Yawata Works and that 
management should be re-forged to include the private sector. The submission from 
Nakano Buei, the president of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and founding chairman 
of Tōyō Iron Works, advanced the view that 'the government’s Yawata works should 
make steel materials for the private sector sites, semiprocessed goods and intermediate 
products (chūkan seihin) for the private sector'.45 The Upper House urged that an 
investigation committee be established to consider the adjustment of  supply and 
demand between government and private sector in the industry. However, to the dismay 
of the private sector, the proposals to fund Yawata’s expansion  passed through the 
Diet. 
 
In May of 1916 the government did set up a shingikai,  the Investigation Committee on 
the Iron and Steel Industry (Seitetsugyō Chōsakai). This comprised  20 members, 
mainly academics and leading businessmen from heavy industry, with the government 
represented by officers from Yawata, from the Imperial Navy and Army, and the National 
Railway Bureau. This was the first time that  heads of private sector steel companies 
were present (as participants in such an investigative committee). The Minister of 
Agriculture and Commerce referred the committee to four areas: 1)  investigation of the 
location of raw materials and their supply for domestic use; 2)  investigation into the 
kinds of pig iron and steel products that would be best for Japan; 3)  co-operation of 
private and government producers; 4) what was necessary for the development of the 
industry.46 Following the creation of this committee, two other subcommittees were also 
established and towards the end of 1916, the results of  all these deliberations were 
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submitted to the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, under the title of  Report of the 
Investigation Committee on the Iron and Steel Industry (Seitetsugyō Chōsakai 
Tōshinsho). 
 
The report suggested a wide range of iron ore supply options that might be examined, 
including the use of low grade iron ore, and more distant supply locations such as  
Australia and the South Pacific, as well as special government assistance. Future 
demand figures were calculated for pig iron and steel materials and projected volumes 
of production. It was suggested that there was likely to be an excess of pig iron 
production, but insufficiency of steel materials. Only one sentence of the relatively 
lengthy report was devoted to the issue of government and private sector cooperation. 
The thrust of this was that co-operation could help to avoid mutual competition and thus 
foster development. The reasons for the cursory manner in which this key issue for the 
private sector was handled are unclear, particularly in light of the composition of the 
committee. Had the matter been adequately considered and co-operation not 
considered appropriate, then such discussion might be expected to be reflected in the 
report. It is likely that this insouciance rankled with the private sector. Perhaps most 
important in terms of its contents, the report also addressed the necessity of 
encouraging the development of the iron manufacturing industry. However, though in 
principle encouraging the development of the private sector, the report recommended a 
10 year tax exemption for ' mills that have a production capacity of above 35,000 tons in 
pig iron and steel'. This figure was highly significant, for it meant that  the bulk of the 
smaller private sector sites excluded from any tax exemption. By contrast, support for 
plants in Korea and China 'was insisted on by Mitsubishi, Ōkura, and the South 
Manchurian Railway Company, since they were establishing works in Korea and China 
that would produce over 35,000 tons of low phosphorous pig iron. Ōkura’s joint venture, 
Ben Xi Hua Coal and Iron Company, which had low phosphorous iron ore, was 
particularly interested in seeking governmental promotion'.47 The extent of the behind-
the-scenes influence of zaibatsu and other large business interests, and in particular the 
rationale for this  35,000 ton barrier is hard to assess. 
 
In protest at the recommendations of the Investigation Committee, Shiraishi Motojirō, the 
director of Nihon Kōkansha (NKK), in May 1916 launched a complaint to the Japan 
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Industry Club. He particularly objected to the 35,000 ton tax limit, which excluded the 
NKK and many other companies.48 He advocated strengthening the industry as a whole, 
proposing that 'without distinction to pig iron and steel, also without distinction to present 
or future, all iron and steel companies should be exempted from tax for more than 25 
years'.49 The following month the Industry Club submitted to the government its own 
submission on the future protection of the iron and steel industry (Honpō Seitetsu Jigyō 
Hogo Shōrei ni kansuru Iken Sho). 
 
The position of the Japan Industry Club 
At the start of the report, Dan Takuma emphasised the multitude of new companies that 
had sprung up since the start of the war and the need to establish long-term self-
sufficiency in steel production. This in turn needed self-sufficiency in pig iron production. 
With this in mind, the report outlined the following six recommendations: 
 
1. Measures to enable steel making sites with an annual manufacturing 
capacity of 35,000 tons pig iron to acquire additional land for  expansion. 
 
2. Plants of over 3.000 tons pig iron manufacturing capacity,and over 
10,000 of steel manufacturing capacity to be exempt from business tax, 
income tax, urban prefecture and prefecture tax, and city, town and 
village tax, for 25 years from the year after opening. 
 
3. With regards to steel manufacturing sites that produce iron as well as 
steel parts for essential machines to be exempt from import tax for 10 
years from the day of promulgation of the law. 
 
4. Sites with an annual pig iron capacity above 3,000 tons, as well as steel 
manufacturing of an annual capacity greater than 10,000 tons, to be 
granted suitable financial assistance for a period of 10 years.  
 
5. Sites just starting to be given encouragement by the government, 
especially with regard to special pig iron. 
 
6. Government steel manufacturing site(s) to make available to private 
steel manufacturers pig iron and steel ingots.50 
 
The Industrial Club was clearly anxious to develop the iron and steel industry as a 
whole. With the production capacity barrier set at 3,000 tons for pig iron and 10,000 tons 
for steel, a far larger number of sites would qualify for support. As a yardstick, one of 
Japan’s first furnaces in 1857 managed to produce about one ton a day.51 Thus, an 
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annual production capacity of 3000 tons, or approximately 8 tons per day, was a 
sufficiently low  barrier to include all but the smallest of sites.  
 
It is clear that both sides acknowledged  that measures were needed to promote the 
development of the industry. However, there was a glaring omission of any concrete 
proposals for joint private-government management, and a significant gap between the 
recommended tonnage levels. Government was not interested in combining private 
sector interests with its own iron and steel making enterprises. Encouragement for the 
industry meant to the government large, well-established sites, while the Japan Industry 
Club, representing the industry as a whole, sought to promote all producers, almost 
regardless of size. These differences reappeared in the Lower and Upper House 
debates, where they were eventually resolved. 
 
Although the formal institutions through which business had to make its case were the 
two Houses of the Diet, the process whereby business and government established and 
made public their positions actually occurred outside these institutions. However, the 
process ran  concurrently with the initial meetings of a Lower House shingikai whose 
members were appointed by government. This membership was drawn from the house 
itself and the cabinet, as well as from academe, business, and the bureaucracy. An 
Upper House shingikai was also established with similar composition, except that the 
Diet representatives were from the Upper House. The discussions of these two shingikai 
progressed over a period of 18 months, and moved from general inquiry into more 
focused and increasingly heated debates.  
 
The Lower House debates : Committee on the Proposal Concerning the Promotion 
and Future of the Iron and Steel Industry (Seitetsu Jigyō Sokushin oyobi Shōrei ni 
kansuru Kengian Iinkai) 
This Committee sat as the 37th Diet debated the proposals for Yawata’s expansion, and 
the private sector responded with its own suggestions as mentioned above. The first 
meeting of this Lower House committee was on 22 January 1916. It was convened in 
total five times, with the final sitting on 24 February. Though reference is made to the 
issue of Yawata’s expansion, most of the discussions of the committee revolved around 
a limited number of issues that were also raised in the Tōron Kai and Imaizumi 
Kaichirō’s report.  
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The question of whether Japan could find from domestic sources sufficient raw material 
for the production of pig iron, and, if not, from where it could be secured, was debated 
throughout the five sittings of the committee. The Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, 
Kōno Hironaka, stated that there was no plan to make Japan independent with regards 
to steel, implicitly acknowledging the lack of domestic sources and the government's 
intention  of going for foreign procurement.52 It was generally recognised that Japan had 
limited sources of iron ore and that reliance on foreign supplies was critical for the 
expansion of the industry. 
 
Kōno also argued from the outset that it was of prime concern to ensure sufficient raw 
material for steel production at government run sites, perhaps inadvertently from the 
outset confirming fears among the private sector over the government’s priorities. At the 
start of the final sitting of the committee, Kōno reiterated that the fundamental problem in 
providing assistance for the private sector was that there was insufficient raw material 
for the industry as a whole. No extent of assistance could allow for the expansion of the 
private sector. He added that were this fundamental problem to be overcome, expansion 
could be achieved. In short, the government did little to help assuage private sector 
fears about adequate raw material supply for all smaller sites. The ‘steel famine’ in 
general, and  private sector fears fuelled by the anticipated increase in demand as a 
result of Yawata’s proposed enlargement, raised the stakes in finding secure sources of 
supply, whether domestically or from abroad. 
 
A similarly negative stance was also taken by government with regards to the proposal 
for joint government and private sector management of steel mills. A considerable gap 
existed between the two positions over the feasibility of implementing this idea. 
Nishimura Tanjirō, a member of the Lower House, observed that from the perspective of 
the government the Japanese industry was still in an 'infant' stage, but from the point of 
view of the private sector businessmen, the industry had already reached a more 
advanced level. As the private sector was functioning independently of government 
support, then by definition it was competitive. If only the government would 'slightly open 
the doors' then the industry would develop more rapidly.53  Though Nishimura did not 
elaborate on what he meant by the term 'doors', he may have been referring to an 
adjustment in import tariffs to facilitate growth. He  went on to urge that the two sides 
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should meet to resolve their differences. Research on the industry must be done 
together and in a formal manner.  
 
Nishimura’s observations were echoed in the arguments of Machida Chūji, a 
government committee member and later minister, on the non-feasibility of joint 
government and private sector management. Showing a greater depth of knowledge of 
the industry than most other participants, Machida explained that the projected cost of 
the third expansion of Yawata was 35,000,000 yen, and would take an estimated 40 
years. The payment scheme was a long term one, and such a burden, even if shared by 
government, would be too great for the private sector. He tried to give some consolation 
by adding that once this expansion had been completed, the proposal for joint 
management could be considered.   
 
Despite this offer, there is an underlying sense of fatalism in the discussion over joint 
management. Though the budget for the expansion had not yet been approved, the 
discussions suggest that there was little chance at this late stage of modifying Yawata’s 
submission to accommodate private sector wishes. Far from being a debate between 
competing sectoral interests, the overwhelming tenor of the five sittings of this 
committee was one of tame inquiry and exploration of issues. Perhaps because this was 
the first committee meeting on the steel industry, arguments were restrained, but there 
was also a general lack of knowledge among those participants whose comments have 
been recorded. In one instance discussion of the quantity of iron ore output in Manchuria 
proceeded on the basis of rumours, there being no firm figures to hand.. Moriya 
Koresuke, an elderly committee member who had held a variety of positions in the iron 
and steel industry as well as having been re-elected to the Lower House 8 times 
between 1906 and 1919, summed up the situation by mentioning that when he had 
studied at school the academic curriculum had not included matters relating to steel 
production and now Japan was a producer of iron and steel; in other words, the pace of 
the development of the iron and steel industry was so fast that it was difficult for 
participants to keep abreast of the changes and have sufficient understanding of iron 
and steel technology to make the judgements required by the shingikai. 
 
The last of the major issues discussed in this first series of committee meetings was 
tariff reduction. The basic line of argument of the private sector was that the rate of 
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protection was too high, unduly hindering the entry of iron ore into the country. Instead 
of being an aid by keeping out cheap foreign produce and encouraging domestic 
production, the tariff exacerbated the lack of iron. The Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce stated that he was receptive to the reduction or elimination of tariffs as 
suggested by the industrialists, but maintained that the fundamental obstacle was the 
basic lack of raw material. Dr. Kobayashi Ushijirō, the chairman, also saw raw material 
as the main problem. He felt that inevitably Japan would have to continue relying to 
some degree on external supply, but pointed out that this was not a unique situation.  In 
both England and Germany one third to one quarter of the supply came from outside the 
country. There should be no problem in relying on the import of iron ore given 
appropriate contracts with suppliers in China and Manchuria.  
 
Essentially, committee members were voicing their opinions, but without appropriate 
research only tentative conclusions could be reached. Machida, the government 
nominee, expounded on a number of possible scenarios, admitting at each step that he 
did not have any answers. The question of whether reduction or elimination of tariffs 
would be beneficial to the private sector was left open to debate. Thus, the first series of 
Lower House committee meetings is perhaps best characterised as exploratory. Both 
private sector and government were still in the process of establishing their positions, 
though attitudes to some of the fundamental issues can already be seen. For 
entrepreneurs concerned over the supply of iron ore, this series of meetings gave 
sufficient grounds for unease about any specific measures government might advocate 
in the coming months. 
 
Committee for the Proposed Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law  
The five sittings between 29 June and 9 July 1917 of a further committee, the 
Committee for the Proposed Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law (Seitetsugyō Shōrei 
Hōan Iinkai) reveal a greater depth of knowledge than previously seen. Where the 
previous committee meetings were exploratory, in this case a draft of the law had 
already been submitted to the committee. The debates were more focused and linked 
with the articles of the proposal.  
 
At the first of the series of discussions of this committee, the new Minister of Agriculture 
and Commerce, Nakakōji Ren, set the tone for the position of government on the 
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proposed measures. He stated that since the beginning of the ‘steel famine’, 
considerable debate had been focussed on the demand for steel. Here, he emphasised, 
the focus would be on the emergency measures needed to address this situation. As a 
first step, he pointed out, the third expansion of Yawata had already been approved, and 
given the current dire straits, all efforts should be directed at benefiting the country, even 
if in the process private sector welfare was sacrificed.54 In order for this to be achieved, 
it was critical that a steady development of the industry be maintained. To this end, he 
proposed that iron and steel mills (seitetsujo) with a production capacity above 35,000 
tons per annum should be given encouragement in order to achieve a solid base for 
steel manufacturing. If, in the pursuit of expansion, additional land was required, 
measures had been included for the necessary expropriation. Firms would be exempted 
from income, business and local taxes, and tax on the import of equipment would be 
waived. The proposed measures should be debated and passed into law as soon as 
possible.55 The position of government was thus clear from the outset. The aim of the 
law was not to create a protective umbrella for the industry as a whole, fostering the 
development of sites regardless of size or need, but rather to promote the expansion of 
the largest mills in the national interest. 
 
Inoue Kakugorō, a prominent businessman and member of the Lower House,56 posed 
the question of whether the development of sites below the 35,000 ton limit would not 
also be of benefit to the country. Instituting measures to create greater unity among 
producers and the systematic harnessing of the production capacity of the smaller sites, 
would also achieve the goals of the Minister.57 In response the Minister observed that it 
was not only a matter of co-ordinating the smaller sites but also a problem of raw 
material. He feared there would not be enough for the various sites, not to mention the 
inadequacy of facilities and transportation.58 
 
Closer to the nub of what irritated the private sector were the reasons for the 
governmental position of 35,000 tons. As one government committee member admitted, 
there had been no investigations conducted as to the failure rate of small scale 
manufacturers, which undermined the arguments suggesting that they were an 
investment risk.59 Throughout the series of committee meetings, a number of 
explanations were posited in support of the favour afforded to the larger sites, one of 
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which was managerial efficiency.60 However, the rationale for this numerical value 
rested purely on research showing that sites that had an output of less than 100 tons per 
day were inefficient, a standard that had been accepted in other countries.61 How 
efficiency was defined was not explained. It was suggested that approximately 167 sites 
would fall under the 35,000 ton limit and not be eligible for the support offered by the 
proposed law.62 The members of the committee were clearly aware that were the law to 
be passed as submitted by the Minister the future of many smaller sites was uncertain.63  
 
In the final stage of the fifth meeting on 9 July, members voted on the proposed law. 
Nakakōji, in a final effort to persuade members of the necessity of accepting the 35,000 
tons barrier, tried to rally support for the government position using the argument of 
national interest.64 An alternative proposal called for reducing the limit for support to 
3,500 tons, and another to 1,500 tons. Voting details are not provided but the outcome 
was in favour of the 3,500 ton position.65 
 
With this vote the Lower House debates drew to a close. Participants had gone beyond 
exploration and begun a serious debate on the proposed measures. Nakakōji, 
representing the government, had from his entrenched position strongly urged members 
to rally around his call in the national interest. However, the vote was a clear sign of 
private sector sentiment. 
 
The Upper House debates : Special Committee on the Proposed Iron and Steel 
Industry Law (Seitetsugyō Shōrei Hōan Tokubetsu Iinkai)  
Following on the heels of the last Lower House committee meeting on 9 July, the first of 
the final two committees, the Special Committee on the Proposed Iron and Steel 
Industry Law of the Upper House, sat on 11 and 12 July 1917. On the first day, the 
proposed law was submitted. Certain parts were then revised. According to the records, 
this was done by the committee and presented the following morning. Debate did not 
commence until the afternoon of 12 July. There were a number of proposed changes to 
the 11 July submission which directly affected the smaller sites and related to the 
capacity issue. In particular, there was a tax provision (Article II) which stated that with 
regards to 'enterprises with facilities that have the steel capacity and pig iron capacity of 
3,500 (35,000) tons per annum, they are exempt for a 10 year period' was of concern.66  
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That afternoon of 12 July, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Nakakōji Ren, 
again explained at considerable length the government position, arguing that given the 
current dearth of steel in Japan, an appropriate policy must be implemented. To that 
end, he explicitly stated the need for a law that would target sites of 35,000 tons 
capacity or a daily rate of 100 tons. The rationale was that directing the country’s 
resources, financial and otherwise, to such sites would maximise the output of iron and 
steel in the national interest. One business committee member, Kamata Katsutarō, 
challenged Nakakōji, stating that the Minister’s reasons were insufficient, and that 'the 
aim of the proposal was to protect large sites'.67 The Minister defended himself with the 
argument that the prime issue was not what was best for the private sector but what was 
best for the country, and reducing the limit to the lower level, raised the possibility of 
jeopardising the success of the large sites.68 The issue then went to a Joint House 
Committee on the Proposed Law for the Future of the Iron and Steel Industry 
(Seitetsugyō Shōrei Hōan Ryōin Kyōgikai), which sat on 13 July 1917 and was 
composed of members from both houses. The range of topics discussed was limited and 
the exchanges on tonnage reveal additional insights into the rationale for either the 
government or the private sector positions. The tone of the discussions, however, was 
different. This was the final day of meetings on the issue and it must have been 
understood that if no compromise position was reached during the talks, a deciding vote 
would be necessary. The meeting commenced with Motoda Hajime, the Lower House 
Speaker, stating his preference for the reduced tonnage position, followed by Viscount 
Inoue Tadashirō, the Deputy Speaker of the Upper House, defending the government 
stance that the fastest path to redressing the iron and steel dearth was through larger 
sites. The exchange between the speakers continued in this vein until Suzuki Umeshirō 
of the Lower House entered the discussion, challenging the government on the rationale 
for its figure of 35,000 tons. Inoue answered, but not to the satisfaction of Suzuki, and 
he continued to press the issue. Tension mounted and finally Suzuki, perhaps by way of 
veiled threat, pointed out the result if a compromise position was not found: 
'this problem of 35,000 tons is the most important problem of all. However, 
unfortunately, if the Lower House and the Upper House do not reach an 
agreement, then unfortunately the proposed Law will collapse'.69 
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Ichiki Kitokurō, a professor of Tokyo Imperial University, former government minister and 
later member of the Upper House, stepped in with a more conciliatory tone, emphasising 
that the aim of this committee was to achieve an understanding:   
'of course this Joint House committee will work to find an agreement. Since 
the outset of this committee the wish for this has been shared by all members 
of the Upper House and all members the Lower House'.70 
 
The discussion proceeded without apparent compromise any closer, eventually leading 
to an agreement to create a subcommittee which would sit and continue the 
discussions. At 2.17 pm, Matsuoka Yasutake, former Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce (1906-08), on behalf of the Upper House, selected three members, while 
Motoda chose three from the Lower House. With the committee reduced from 20 to 8 
appointees, the discussions proceeded for about three hours. The records do not 
contain the contents of these talks. At 5.12 pm the full committee resumed, and the 
results of the closed talks were disclosed. Motoda announced that the compromise 
position on Article II was 5,250 tons, reduced from 35,000 tons; the 3,500 tons specified 
in Article III had been modified to 5,250 tons.71 A number of interlocutors, including 
Nakakōji, not formally a member of the committee, expressed their satisfaction with the 
results and the proposed law was voted though.72 
 
Why 5250 tons and to whose benefit? 
Initial consideration suggests that though the agreed figure was not 3000 tons as sought 
by the Lower House members, 5250 tons was quite close, and the private sector had 
reason to be pleased with the outcome. Certainly those firms whose annual capacity 
was equivalent to or exceeded the compromise tonnage were likely to have been happy. 
However, their numbers were relatively few. In 1913 there were 21 iron and steel firms. 
By 1918 there were 208. The majority of these newly arisen enterprises had seen the 
war boom as an opportunity to enter the market, but their viability would be in question 
were this egregious level of demand to fall. Indeed the post-war economic decline 
witnessed a serious contraction and of the 208 firms operating in 1918, only 60 
remained in 1923. More importantly for our purposes here, 166 of the 187 new firms that 
sprang up were under 5000 tons capacity. Thus, in terms of who benefited from the 
Promotion Law, the vast majority of firms  still fell below the cut off line. Moreover, many 
of those which did were also zaibatsu-owned. So, the question arises as to who the 8 
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committee members were who made the final decision, and whether they represented 
the interests of big business to the exclusion of the remaining private sector firms. Given 
the absence of records, we are not ultimately able to go beyond speculation in 
assessing the rationale for the sub-committee’s decision to select 5250 tons as the 
break-off point. In light of the preponderance of small sites that fell below the 5250 ton 
mark, though, we can consider who were the winners and losers. The following table 
provides the break down of the industry according to market shares in iron and steel in 
1918. 
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Table 1: Market Shares in Iron and Steel in 1918 (tons; %) 
 
 
Pig Iron 
Tons/  
Annum 
%  Crude Steel Tons/ 
Annum 
%  Finished 
Steel 
Tons/ 
Annum 
% 
Yawata 271, 578 46.6  Yawata  444,735 54.7  Yawata   306, 419 56.8 
Kamaishi   67,946 11.7  Kamaishi    21,881  2.7  Kamaishi     17, 414  3.2 
Wanishi   82,866 14.2  NKK1    69,689  8.6  NKK     49, 788  9.2 
Sites using 
charcoal2 
  34,246   5.9  Nihon 
Seiko-sho 
   82,341 10.1  Nihon 
Seiko-sho 
    26, 763  5.0 
Sumidagawa 
Seitetsujo* 
  12,550   2.2  Sumitomo 
Copper 
   21,778  2.7  Sumitomo 
Copper 
    14, 968  2.8 
Tobata Imono     5,783   1.0  Sumitomo 
Steel 
Casting 
    5, 678  0.7  Sumitomo 
Steel 
Casting 
     18, 777   3.5 
Reclaimed 
(scrap) 
  80,230 16.9  Kobe Steel 
Works 
   27,503  3.4  Kobe Steel 
Works 
    21, 923  4.1 
Others   27,559   4.7  Kawasaki 
Hyogo Steel 
Works 
   28,711   3.5  Kawasaki 
Hyogo Steel 
Works 
    22, 450  4.2 
    Kawasaki 
Shipbuilding 
Fukiai 
Works* 
   12,912  1.6  Kawasaki 
Shipbuilding 
Fukiai 
Works* 
      5,939  1.1 
    Asano 
Kokura 
Steel*  
    5,831    .7  Asano 
Kokura 
Steel* 
    12,118  2.2 
    Tokyo Kozai 
Company* 
    7,576    .9  Tokyo Kozai 
Company* 
      5,265  1.0 
    Nihon 
Chuko* 
    5,346   .7     
    Osaka Steel*    10,945  1.3  Osaka Steel*       8,030  1.5 
    Others     68,293  8.4  Others     29,783  5.5 
Total 582,758   Total  813, 219   Total   539, 637  
 
Source MITI (ed.), Shōkō seisaku, vol. 17 Tekkōgyō (Tokyo: Shōkōseisakushi kankokai, 
1970), pp. 199-200. Note: “*” were sites formed during World War I. 
 
1 Also known as Japan Steel-Tube, Inc. 
 
2 Charcoal (mokutan), the carbon remains from wood, have similar burning properties as coal. 
Charcoal was superceded by coal as the preferred energy sources in the production of iron and 
steel. 
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Of the 15 private sector production sites listed above, six were not affiliated with 
zaibatsu or government ministries: Osaka Steel, Nihon Chuko, Tokyo Kozai Company, 
Sumidagawa Seitetsujo, Tobata Imono, and Kamaishi. The remaining ones were 
affiliated with zaibatsu: NKK, Sumitomo Copper and Sumitomo Steel Casting, Asano 
Kokura Steel, the two Kawasaki sites and Wanishi. NKK was owned by Imaizumi 
Kaichirō and Shiraishi Motojirō, however, Shiraishi was the son-in-law of Asano Sōichirō, 
the founder of Asano zaibatsu. Wanishi was owned by the Hokkaido Coal and Shipping 
Company (HCSC) and in 1913 became affiliated with Mitsui zaibatsu. Of the remaining 
companies that were to receive subsidisation, Kamaishi was owned by Tanaka Chōbei, 
an entrepreneur, though was purchased by Mitsui zaibatsu after the war, and Nihon 
Seikō-sho was owned by HCSC and Armstrong and Vickers. Sumitomo Copper, Kobe 
Steel, Kawasaki Hyogo, and Nihon Seikō-sho 'all had strong ties with the Navy and the 
NRB [National Railway Bureau], developing to supply their special needs'.73 Though 
there were a significant number of sites which would receive the benefit of the law that 
were zaibatsu affiliated or had close connections with government, six of the 15 were 
not. Among the crude steel producers, the non-affiliated held 12% of the market share, 
when factoring out Yawata’s contribution, and finished steel producers held 13%. 
Independent pig iron producers held 28% of the share without Yawata’s contribution 
considered. Thus, the market share of non-affiliated independent producers was low, 
and much lower if Yawata were included, and if influence in the decision making process 
is judged in terms of market share, then it stands to reason that the limit should have 
been higher. When considering that the economic clout of the zaibatsu, who figured 
large in the production of Japan’s steel either through direct ownership or otherwise, 
stemmed from their panoply of holding companies, one imagines that they would have 
had considerable say in the tonnage limit. Further, given that the government position 
was rooted in the argument of efficiency and that such small producers as Tokyo Kozai 
Company, Nihon Chūkō and Osaka Steel were to benefit from the proposed law, it 
seems likely that other factors were at play in the tonnage decision beyond big business 
influence. The selected tonnage figure does not seem, therefore, to have been 
specifically chosen according to a zaibatsu or big business versus small business 
delineation. 
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The background of committee members, in particular the more vocal ones who took 
leading roles in the discussions, is an important component in trying to evaluate how 
decisions were reached. The positions members held could conceivably have been a 
function of their particular interests. Bureaucrats, for example, might adopt a stance 
close to the position outlined by the leading government speaker at the outset of the 
committee meeting. Businessmen, on the other hand, might be concerned with 
maximising their personal financial interests, while politicians might normally be 
expected to toe the party line. However, such delineation is too neat to adequately 
describe the situation in Japan during the first decades of the 20th century. One of the 
most striking characteristics of the twenty members who made up the Joint House 
Committee is that in almost all cases their career paths traversed the boundaries 
between politics, the civil service and business. It was not uncommon for a civil servant 
to rise through the hierarchy and later either move into business and assume a leading 
role in a company, or follow a political path. Equally, businessmen sought election and, 
wearing two hats, pursued a political career. These observations apply to the sub-
committee as well.  
 
A close look at the make-up of the 8-member sub-committee that made the final 
decision may serve to underscore these points. The following table gives an indication of 
this diversity of interests.  
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Table 2:  Members of the Sub-committee 
 
a) House of Peers 
Name Primary 
Occupation 
Cabinet 
Appointment 
Business 
Connection 
Academic 
Connection 
Other 
Baron 
Matsuoka 
Yasutake 
(1864-
1923)
Lawyer Minister of 
Agriculture and 
Commerce  
1906-1908 
 President of 
Nihon 
University 1920 
Privy 
Councillor, 
Baron 1917 
 
 
Viscount 
Inoue 
Tadashirō 
(1876-
1954) 
Businessman  President of 
Anshan Iron 
and Steel 
Works, and 
Fushu 
Colliery 
 
Professor 
Tokyo Imperial 
University 
 
Ichiki 
Kitokurō 
(1867-
1944) 
Bureaucrat / 
politician 
Minister of various 
departments 
including Home 
Affairs 1915-16 and 
Education 1914-15 
 
 Professor at 
Tokyo Imperial 
University 1894 
Privy 
Councillor 
1917 
Fujita 
Shirō 
Businessman Director-general of 
Agriculture and 
Commerce 1900 
Business 
appointments, 
not 
specifically 
related to the 
iron and steel 
industry 
Tokyo Imperial 
University Alma 
Mater 
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(Tabel 2 continued) 
b) House of Representatives  
Name Primary  
Occupation 
Cabinet 
Appointment 
Business  
Connection 
Academe Other 
Motoda 
Hajime 
(1858-1938) 
Politician Minister of 
Communications  
in 1913-14 and 
Railways 1920-22 
 
 Graduated  
in 1880 from  
Kaiseijo (later Tokyo 
Imperial University) 
Privy  
Councilor 
Tokonami 
Takejirō 
(1867-1935) 
Bureaucrat/ 
politician 
Home Minister  
1918-22 
 Graduated from  
Tokyo Imperial 
University in 1890 
President of 
Imperial 
Government 
Railways in 
1913 
 
Suzuki 
Umeshirō 
(1862-1940) 
  Mitsui Bank 
and Ōji Paper 
Manufacturing 
Company 
 
Graduated from  
Keio Gijuku in 1887 
editor of Jiji 
Shinpō 
 
Furuya 
Hisatsuna 
(1874-1919) 
    
Professor at Tokyo  
Higher Commercial  
School 
 
Imperial 
Household 
Department  
in 1909 
 
 
Information extracted from: 1) The Japan Biographical Encyclopaedia & Who’s Who 
1964-65; 2) The Who’s Who in Japan 1937; 3) The Japan Year Book 1916 & 1918; 4) 
Nihon Rekishi Jinbutsu Jiten; 5) Seijika Jinmei Jiten; 6) Asahi Jinbutsu Jiten. 
 
The sub-committee members appear to have established close connections in the upper 
circles of government. Four members had at some point held one or more ministerial 
positions. They were senior figures in their respective fields, and their careers, which 
had commenced in the early formative period after the Meiji Restoration, were varied. In 
terms of education, there were several graduates of Tokyo Imperial University, most 
having studied law. Though not necessarily classmates, their early institutional 
development was a shared one. Notwithstanding the zigzagged paths that their careers 
followed, there was a certain homogeneity of background.  
 
In trying to establish any links between sub-committee membership and the decision to 
go for 5250 tons, we need to ask who might have represented the state and who 
represented big business. We know the sub-committee was numerically equally divided 
  
 45
between the Upper and Lower Houses, but should not assume that all Upper House 
members voted for a figure that was in accordance with the government position. One 
factor that might have influenced Upper House members against voting in line with the 
government position was their business connection(s). Viscount Inoue, a high ranking 
member of Japan’s nobility appointed by the emperor, was president of the Anshan Iron 
and Steel Works. Anshan was part of the South Manchurian Railway Company, and also 
linked to Yawata through technological support.74 Fujita Shirō had numerous 
connections with business, but no direct links with the iron and steel industry. Based on 
business connections, neither Inoue or Fujita would seem to have had reason to vote 
against the government position. The other two Upper House members, Matsuoka 
Yasutake and Ichiki Kitokurō, were both members of the Privy Council. It seems not 
unlikely that they had a vested concern in advancing government interest, and might 
vote in line with the government position. The remaining member with business 
connections was Suzuki Umeshirō, a member of the House of Representatives. He was 
linked to Mitsui zaibatsu which did have an interest in the iron and steel industry through 
Wanishi, one of the firms above the cut-off point. If all four members of the House of 
Peers had voted in accordance with the government position, and Suzuki to have voted 
similarly, then the government position would have triumphed regardless of the 
sentiments of the remaining Lower House members. Even such a scenario cannot, 
however, explain the specific choice of the figure of 5250.  
 
The close associations and overlapping backgrounds of many committee members 
might suggest that positions in the debates would not be particularly divergent. 
However, as we have seen, this was not the case. The composition of the subcommittee 
was split between the Houses, and this was a determining factor in shaping the 
argument. Two leading voices in the debates were Motoda of the Lower House, who 
argued for the reduction of the tonnage figure, and Inoue of the Upper House who 
pushed for the government position. The debate was not obviously shaped by the 
personal interests of the members, though this factor cannot be eliminated, but seems to 
have been more influenced by which half of the bicameral structure they occupied. The 
members from the House of Representatives seem to have represented the interests of 
the steel and iron industry as a whole. This ran counter to the government aim, 
represented by the House of Peers, of fostering the development of the larger sites.  
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Conclusion 
How the compromise figure of 5,250 tons was arrived at therefore remains unanswered. 
Critical, though, is that the result was achieved through a formal procedure. The process 
of position formulation transpired over 18 months, during which investigations were 
conducted and committees met. As the positions of government and the private sector 
became clearer and the debates approached the final days, arguments became 
increasingly heated. For both sides the stakes were high. Government had a vested 
interest in seeing that national resources be directed to the largest sites, including its 
own Yawata, while the private sector feared that the small capacity iron and steel mills 
would disappear without appropriate measures in place. The adoption of a low capacity 
tonnage would not jeopardise the larger sites, but government did firmly believe that this 
was not in the interest of Japan as a whole. Certainly many of the smaller sites had only 
just appeared and their viability, particularly in the absence of war demand, was 
questionable. Furthermore, given that the passage of bills required the approval of both 
the Upper and Lower Houses, pressure was placed on committee members to work out 
their differences in the relatively favourable setting of a shingikai rather than risk the 
proposal's becoming ensnared in house debates, which could mean either collapse or 
alteration in a way disadvantageous to one of the sides. It was in this committee setting 
that the critical compromise occurred. Once agreement had been reached here, 
passage through the Houses could be expected to be a largely perfunctory process.   
 
There are at least two ways of judging the degree to which business influenced the 
outcome of the Promotion Law by results and by process. In terms of results, given that 
the bulk of sites were below 5,000 tons, then one might argue that only a small 
percentage benefited and therefore the aim of promoting the industry as a whole failed. 
Strictly speaking this is true. The Industry Club of Japan sought a result that would 
promote the industry as a whole, and, through this law, help foster the fledgling private 
sector. That fewer than one third of the sites remained in 1923 does not necessarily 
mean that if the law had been more generous a greater number would have survived, as 
post-war economic contraction was severe.  
 
A process based assessment must note that the position of the industry was so fervently 
argued by its representatives that it was only through the 8 member committee that 
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agreement could be reached. The fervour with which both sides defended their positions 
suggests that the process was not an orchestrated facade with a predetermined 
outcome arranged through informal channels. Clearly informal means may have been 
exercised, but even if they were, the critical compromise position was achieved in the 
context of the final sub-committee. Since the debates of this sub-committee are not on 
record, it can be argued that in the final analysis it was still ‘back-room dealing’ that 
resolved the issue. However, this was resorted to only because an outcome had not 
been reached elsewhere, and because members tenaciously held to their positions, 
which they had been granted a right to express and defend through the 
institutionalisation of the formal committee process.  It would be dangerous to push this 
position too far. A network existed between elite businessmen and politicians, and it 
would be incredible if informal discussions had not occurred. Nevertheless, the evidence 
on these debates supports the argument that business did effectively use formal 
channels to exercise its influence.  
 
There remains the larger question of why business and government used the shingikai 
forum to seek a compromise on such an important issue.  Given the financial stakes and 
the historical legacy of close government and business interaction, it might be 
reasonable to expect greater reliance on behind the scenes negotiation. The answer to 
this question is problematic. We have limited detailed knowledge of how the two 
operated together in this period, and this case study is limited to the decision making 
process concerning just one law. Despite these shortcomings, this case study suggests 
that neither was government controlled by business, nor business controlled by 
government. Moreover, there is no evidence of a sense of reciprocity or tacit agreement 
of a quid pro quo way of interacting. It could, of course, also be argued that the conflict 
was not indicative of the relationship in general, and that there may have been an 
overall understanding which framed the interaction of the two sides in this specific case. 
The formal process, the shingikai, may have been seen as a forum for the resolution of 
conflict located within the larger context of a harmonious relationship.  
 
I would suggest here that one important factor in the establishment of any relationship 
between government and business is the extent of stability in the political world. In the 
case of Japan’s early years of party development, such stability was lacking. Between 
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the first Itō cabinet in 1885 and the Terauchi cabinet (1916-1918), there were 18 new 
cabinets. Nor had government been inclined to intervene in the market to bail out ailing 
businesses. Bankruptcies were widespread. Taking into consideration these factors, 
politico-business relations in this period can perhaps be best characterized as in a 
period of transition, during which both government and business were learning to 
operate in a new economic and political environment. The historical legacy of their 
relationship undoubtedly  persisted into this period, and informal personal contacts 
remained important. However, this was also a period in which some major business 
interests tried to maintain a degree of distance from government. This is not to say that 
they left government to make decisions alone, but rather that business maintained 
sufficient contact to have access to key figures when necessary, but sufficient distance 
not to be dictated to by government. The shingikai provided a forum for both sides to 
come together without reverting to the closed door format. The impact of World War I on 
Japan’s iron and steel industry created a situation in which their economic interests 
collided. The fact that the shingikai forum was used as a means of resolving these 
differences indicates that it was perceived as a suitable arena for such a resolution. 
 
With the passage of time, government and business managed to establish an 
understanding. As Miles Fletcher has noted:   
'The business community during the interwar era gradually became convinced of 
the need for what scholars would now label a corporatist relationship in order to 
pursue effective trade policy [and].... By the mid-1930s executives envisioned a 
formal structure of mutual consultation with the government'.75  
 
In the Taishō period, that corporatist relationship had not yet developed. What we have 
seen here is one step in learning how to operate together. The shingikai was in this case 
seen by business as a forum which offered it the chance to express its views and have 
an impact on the policy making process. 
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